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CORRUPT INTENTIONS:
BRIBERY, UNLAWFUL GRATUITY, AND
HONEST-SERVICES FRAUD
ALEX STEIN*
I
INTRODUCTION
This article advances the understanding of bribery and related offenses from
1
an economic standpoint. Economic theory holds that the legal system should
impose criminal liability on a person who advances his goals by using force or
artifice instead of a voluntary exchange. Force and artifice are inherently
coercive behaviors, unresponsive to the market mechanisms that put exchange
prices on what people want to achieve. Because market mechanisms cannot
control such behaviors, the state should step in and impose criminal
punishments on the perpetrators. These punishments should discourage future
coercive behavior. Therefore, they ought to be high enough to offset the
benefits that perpetrators expect to gain from acting coercively against other
2
people’s interests.
Bribery and related offenses have a uniform structure: A public official
receives something of value from a private person in exchange for acting or
promising to act to the private person’s benefit. Any such transaction divides
between the parties some asset or opportunity belonging to the government.
The private person derives profit from misappropriating or obliterating the
government’s interest and gives part of this profit to the public official. Any
such transaction is necessarily coercive toward the government. For, as a
consequence of the official’s betrayal, the government suffers a deprivation of
its interest, asset, or opportunity. Both parties to this transaction gain from
bypassing the market. Each of them generates an off-market benefit not
obtainable through voluntary exchange and the system of rules governing that
3
exchange. Presence of this two-sided off-market benefit separates bribery and
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1. For an outstanding analysis of bribery from a moral point of view, see Stuart P. Green, What’s
Wrong with Bribery, in DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
143, 151–64 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005) (using moral culpability criteria to explain
elements of bribery offense).
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 273–78 (8th ed. 2011).
3. In this article, “market” and “voluntary exchange” have broad meanings. These concepts refer
not only to business transactions, but also to people’s social organization and functioning through
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related offenses from noncriminal transactions and, in particular, from
noncriminal—but still unethical—violations of the various conflict-of-interest
rules.
This market-focused criterion helps identify evidence that conclusively
establishes the mens rea and the actus reus for bribery and related offenses.
This criterion also helps identify the proper scope of the honest-services fraud
4
5
offense. In two precedential decisions, Sun-Diamond and Skilling, the
Supreme Court has narrowed the government’s ability to prosecute individuals
for those offenses. In Sun-Diamond, it held that proof of bribery and unlawful
gratuity incorporates the government’s duty to identify the specific official act
6
for which the bribe or gratuity was given. In Skilling, the Court decided that
presence of a bribe or a kickback payment is one of the elements of honest7
services fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346. This interpretation created an overlap
between bribery and unlawful gratuity on the one hand, and honest-services
8
fraud on the other. By creating this overlap, the Court introduced the stringent
requirement for establishing mens rea, set up in Sun-Diamond, into the
definition of honest-services fraud.
These narrow interpretations of core corruption offenses have removed the
threat of criminal responsibility from a wide variety of off-market transactions
that benefit public officials and private individuals at the government’s expense.
By adopting these interpretations, the Court undercut Congress’s antidemocratic institutions.
4. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
5. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
6. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404–14.
7. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2925–31.
8. The elements of bribery, on the one hand, and unlawful gratuity, on the other hand, are
succinctly described by Justice Scalia in Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404:
The first crime, described in § 201(b)(1) as to the giver, and § 201(b)(2) as to the recipient, is
bribery, which requires a showing that something of value was corruptly given, offered, or
promised to a public official (as to the giver) or corruptly demanded, sought, received,
accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a public official (as to the recipient) with
intent, inter alia, “to influence any official act” (giver) or in return for “being influenced in the
performance of any official act” (recipient). The second crime, defined in § 201(c)(1)(A) as to
the giver, and in § 201(c)(1)(B) as to the recipient, is illegal gratuity, which requires a showing
that something of value was given, offered, or promised to a public official (as to the giver), or
demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a public
official (as to the recipient), “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed
by such public official.”
The key difference between these two crimes, in Justice Scalia’s words, is as follows:
Bribery requires intent “to influence” an official act or “to be influenced” in an official act,
while illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted “for or because of”
an official act . . . . An illegal gratuity . . . may constitute merely a reward for some future act
that the public official will take (and may already have determined to take), or for a past act
that he has already taken.
Id. at 404–05.
The statutory prohibition of honest-services fraud is much broader than these two
offences: it criminalizes and punishes any “scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
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corruption policies and weakened the deterrence against corruption. Under my
“two-sided off-market benefit” criterion for identifying criminal corruption,
these interpretations are economically misguided and therefore wrong.
This article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I carry out an economic analysis
of bribery and related offenses and identify their common characteristic:
presence of an off-market benefit on both sides of the illicit transaction. In Parts
III and IV, respectively, I use this analysis to demonstrate that the Supreme
Court’s precedential decisions in Sun-Diamond and Skilling are mistaken. A
short conclusion follows.
II
THE ECONOMICS OF BRIBERY
The economic approach to law calls for an imposition of criminal liability
upon people who act coercively, and only upon those people. As I indicated at
the outset, a person acts coercively when he bypasses the market by using force
9
or artifice, instead of a voluntary exchange, as a means for promoting his goals.
Market bypass is the main economic reason for holding a person liable
criminally, rather than civilly, in cases in which he behaves in a socially harmful
way. This reason works particularly well with bribery and related offenses
because bribery is an economically driven, market-bypassing transaction by
design.
Bribery encompasses three types of illicit deal: proprietary, bureaucratic,
10
and letting-off. Proprietary bribery features a government’s agent who grants a
governmental contract or franchise to a person (or firm) and receives money or
11
its equivalent in return. The briber bypasses the competition with other
bidders and obtains from the agent a favorable off-market deal with the
government. The agent thus helps the briber to steal from the government in
exchange for money or its equivalent.
Bureaucratic bribery involves no theft. Instead, it expedites the briber’s
12
acquisition of an official permit, license, or document. The briber can obtain
the required permit, license, or document lawfully by following certain
procedures or by waiting in the applicants’ queue. The briber, however, chooses
to act unlawfully: He pays the government’s agent for the red tape’s removal or
for bypassing the queue.
In this scenario, no one may actually get hurt. The agent does not give the
briber a permit, a license, or a document that the briber was not supposed to
receive from the government. Law-abiding citizens queuing for the
9. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 273–78.
10. For an economic analysis of the first two types of bribery, see generally Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599 (1993). For an economic analysis of the third type
of bribery, as contrasted with extortion, see generally Fahad Khalil et al., Bribery Versus Extortion:
Allowing the Lesser of Two Evils, 41 RAND J. ECON. 179 (2010).
11. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 10, at 601–02.
12. Id.
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government’s permits, licenses, and documents endure no delays either (this
will not always be the case: I make this assumption for the sake of clarity).
Under the bureaucratic bribery scenario, the agent issues their permits, licenses,
and documents properly and at a scheduled time. At the same time, he
introduces a private improvement in the functioning of the government’s
agency by making it more productive. Ideally, of course, it is the government
that should make such improvements, but the government does not know it can
improve the agency’s productivity (or does not care about improving the
agency’s work). The agent exploits the government’s ignorance (or
indifference) by introducing the improvement privately at the briber’s expense,
while capturing its economic value (the bribe).
The third and final variant of bribery is letting-off—a deal involving a lawenforcement agent who allows his briber to break the law and go unpunished
13
(after paying the agent). When the agent sabotages the government’s
enforcement effort, the government suffers a tangible deprivation. The briber’s
deal with the agent consequently becomes similar to proprietary bribery. The
government’s enforcement and deterrent capacity, however, will not always be
eroded as a consequence of such a deal. Consider a government that rations its
enforcement effort by requiring its agents to enforce the law against eighty
percent of the violators. The agent collects bribes from twenty randomly chosen
violators out of one hundred and lets them off, while meticulously enforcing the
law against the remaining eighty violators. In this scenario, the government gets
what it pays the agent for, while the agent delivers on his undertaking to the
government. Moreover, twenty violators that the government was ready to let
off completely are now paying a private “violation tax” to the agent. As a result,
violators are better deterred overall than under the government’s plan.
To illustrate, assume that the twenty bribers pay the agent $100 each, while
each of the remaining eighty violators pays the government a $150 fine. The
violators thus pay collectively $14,000 for their misdeeds, as opposed to the
$12,000 that they would have paid under the government’s plan. The collection
of an additional $2000 from the violators shows that the government’s
enforcement method was suboptimal. Under perfect information, the
government would have set the fine at $140 and required the agent to enforce
the law against every violator. The government was unaware of this possible
improvement because the agent did not reveal that he could be more
productive in enforcing the law. Instead of revealing this information to the
government, he improved the violators’ deterrence privately in order to benefit
himself. The agent’s action thus constitutes a mirror image of bureaucratic
bribery. In the bureaucratic bribery scenario, the agent is paid privately for
improving the functioning of the government’s agency. Here, he is paid
privately for not making the required improvement.
Understanding these different forms of bribery is crucial for the economic
13. This type of bribery is discussed in Khalil et al., supra note 10, at 179–82 (focusing on bribery
by enforcement officers, also capable of extorting payments from private citizens).
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analysis of anti-corruption laws. This understanding can also facilitate
normative inquiries into the requisite mens rea standards. Each form of bribery
is an off-market contract incorporating the parties’ motives and intentions. The
contract does not state those motives and intentions publicly because they are
unlawful and the parties consequently try to conceal them. Courts, however,
can ascertain those motives and intentions by juxtaposing the parties’ exchange
against the market. When the exchange aligns with transactions available on the
open market, it does not constitute bribery (nor is it normally intended to form
a bribery deal). Conversely, when the exchange bypasses the market and yields
off-market gains to both the payer and the official, the requisite intent to give
and accept a bribe will be present and bribery will be established. The purpose
of this test is to separate coercive behavior that should be criminalized from the
market behavior that should not, and I will say more about it later in this article.
Bribery always generates an off-market gain for both parties at the
government’s expense. As a consequence of any such deal, the government
suffers a proprietary deprivation or is denied its agent’s good service (for which
it both paid the agent and sacrificed the opportunity to hire a better agent). The
government did not authorize any such deal. The briber and the agent therefore
acted coercively, and hence criminally, against the government’s interest. The
economic value of the entitlement stolen from the government determines the
off-market gain that the parties—the briber and the agent—split among
themselves. This ill-gotten gain determines the total “quid pro quo” amount
upon which courts should focus in adjudicating bribery cases. Courts should
focus on this gain alone because transactions generating no off-market gains for
both parties do not constitute bribery or unlawful gratuity.
Consider a government’s agent who has an obligation to issue a passport to
a citizen. The agent lets the citizen understand that he will issue the passport
only if the citizen pays him $100. The citizen pays the agent $100 and receives
14
the passport. Under this set of facts, the agent is guilty of extortion while the
citizen—the extortion’s victim—is completely innocent. Neither party is guilty
of bribery. The reason is simple: The government (unlike the extorted citizen)
had suffered no coercive deprivation. The citizen received her passport from
the government, but she was entitled to receive it from the beginning.
Importantly, the citizen did not try to expedite the issuance of her passport by
paying $100 to the agent. She paid the agent $100 to remove his threat not to
issue the passport. The citizen consequently did not obtain any off-market
advantage for herself. Her benefit from the deal with the agent—the passport—
was available on the marketplace in which citizens openly deal with the
14. See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003) (describing the common-law
crime of extortion as “a property offense committed by a public official who took ‘any money or thing
of value’ that was not due to him under the pretense that he was entitled to such property by virtue of
his office,” while adding that modern legislation, both state and federal, has expanded the definition of
that crime to include acts by private individuals); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2006) (the “Hobbs
Act”) (“The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”).
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government. This marketplace is the passport agency and its rules, set up by the
citizens through their democracy mechanism. Moreover, the citizen would not
be guilty of attempted bribery even if she offered the agent $100 on the false
belief that this is her only way to obtain the passport. Under this scenario, the
citizen will be acting under an erroneous assumption that she is being
extorted—a mistake that does not turn her into a briber. The citizen could only
be guilty of bribery if she paid the agent $100 for expediting the passport’s
15
issuance. This transaction would generate an off-market benefit for each party.
This analytical framework turns the mental-element requirement for bribery
and related offenses into an issue of contract interpretation. Every bribery
deal—proprietary, bureaucratic, and letting-off—incorporates an off-market
exchange that the parties intend to accomplish. This exchange can be specified
and unconditional: The briber may pay the official for a specific action or
decision that promotes the briber’s interest. The exchange can also be specified
but conditional: The briber may pay the official for a favorable action (or
decision) that the official will only take (or make) should an appropriate
opportunity present itself. Finally, the exchange can be completely unspecified:
The briber may pay the official for maintaining a favorable disposition or
goodwill towards the briber. This disposition means that the official will, or
might, help the briber at some point down the road, but only if an appropriate
opportunity presents itself and without making any definite promise for help.
The first type of exchange replicates a regular contract, while the second has
the structure of a conditional agreement. The third type of exchange follows the
16
path of an underspecified relational contract. Correspondingly, in the first type
of exchange, the parties form an unconditional intent to give and accept a bribe,
whereas in the second, the parties’ intent to give and accept a bribe is
conditional. The third type of exchange is different from the previous two in
that it only sets up a general bonding relationship between the parties. Under a
legitimate relational contract, this relationship requires parties to act in good
faith and to mutually promote each other’s interests in all situations not
expressly regulated by the contract. Here, this relationship establishes
favoritism: The briber pays the official to make him favorably disposed towards
15. The citizen also might be guilty of attempted bribery if she offered the agent $100 for the
passport on the mistaken belief that the agent has the power to deny her application. Her bribery
attempt would have been impossible, but likely punishable under the “objective act” test that courts
use to separate factually impossible, and hence punishable, attempts from attempts that are legally
impossible and not punishable. The citizen’s objective act could have accomplished bribery if the
circumstances of the case were as she believed them to be. See Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A
Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 537–42 (2008) (explaining the “objective act” test and
attesting that several federal courts use it). But see People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (N.Y. 1906)
(exonerating defendant who accepted an undercover police informant’s proposal to buy stolen cloth as
the cloth’s owners allowed police to offer it for sale in a sting operation); R v. Taaffe, [1984] A.C. 539
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (exonerating defendant who smuggled a package containing cannabis
under the mistaken belief that he participates in an illegal importation of foreign currency into Great
Britain).
16. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 877 (2000).
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the briber, and the official accepts the payment to create this disposition. The
official’s disposition is neither a promise nor an undertaking, but it does
motivate the official to promote the briber’s interests at the government’s
expense. Therefore, technically, the payment (or its equivalent) that the official
receives from the briber is not a “bribe.” For it does not induce the official to
take any specific action in the briber’s favor. The payment, however, turns the
briber into the official’s favorite and, therefore, constitutes an unlawful gratuity
17
(or honest-services fraud ).
Conditional intent to commit a crime is generally as bad and as punishable
18
as an unconditional one. The mens rea accompanying regular and conditional
bribery is therefore relatively easy to ascertain. When the payer and the official
strike a mutually beneficial deal not available on the open market, their deal
constitutes bribery (whether conditional or unconditional). The parties’
exchange of the off-market benefits—the private benefit to the official and the
governmental benefit to the payer—can never be accidental. Hence, it is
intentional, and the court need not carry out any further investigation into the
parties’ motivations.
The same market analysis applies to non-token gratuities. When the gratuity
the official receives from the payer does not fall within the scope of the regular
market exchange, it establishes favoritism—a bond the official and the payer
are not supposed to form. As in core bribery cases, the parties’ exchange reveals
their economic goals: The payer gives the official a pecuniary benefit to make
the official favorably disposed towards his interests, and the official accepts the
benefit—because he wants it—and forms the disposition that the payer expects
him to form. This economic consequence cannot be accidental and, therefore,
establishes the parties’ intents. There is no reason to believe that payers and
officials strike favoritism deals innocently without intending to create
favoritism. Unlawful gratuity can thus be perceived an inchoate, or preparatory,
19
variant of bribery—a smaller, less serious “sister offense.”
From an economic standpoint, this market-focused approach is superior to
every other approach. The criminal law’s mens rea requirement promotes two
economic goals. First, it helps identify coercive transgressors who bypass the
market with the help of force or artifice, instead of transacting with the relevant
20
actors voluntarily. Because a person cannot bypass the market accidentally,
without being aware of his conduct’s nature and likely consequences,
economically minded scholars believe that criminal liability cannot be imposed
upon people who acted without intent, knowledge, or awareness. Second, and
equally important, the mens rea requirement reduces individuals’ cost of
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (defining honest-services fraud as any “scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services”).
18. For general analysis of conditional intent, see Gideon Yaffe, Conditional Intent and Mens Rea,
10 LEGAL THEORY 273 (2004).
19. See United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (contrasting unlawful gratuity and
bribery while calling the former a “lesser included offense”).
20. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 294–95.

STEIN_BOOKPROOF_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

68

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

3/12/2012 3:12 PM

[Vol. 75:61

obtaining information concerning the circumstances and probable consequences
21
of their actions. Because a person cannot be held criminally responsible for
matters outside his knowledge, he need not investigate facts and possibilities of
which he is not aware. The person’s assurance that he can act upon his
knowledge makes it easy and, consequently, relatively cheap for him to avoid
22
criminal liability. Removal of this assurance would result in a socially
deleterious chilling effect: The person would find it difficult to satisfy the
demands of criminal law, and the ensuing fear of punishment would motivate
him to steer away from activities that might benefit society.
The market approach to mens rea for bribery promotes these goals. This
approach gives courts a handy toolset for identifying bribery and its underlying
motivations. Under this approach, any off-market exchange between the
government’s agent and a private person will constitute bribery when it yields
both parties a benefit. The parties’ revealed motivation—mutual enrichment at
the government’s expense—will establish their intent to bypass the market in
every individual case. This motivation will suffice even when the parties’ quidpro-quo arrangement is not completely specified.
Adoption of this market-focused approach will exert no chilling effects on
socially beneficial activities. Under this approach, the government’s agents and
the individuals they deal with will have a safe harbor—the open market, which
they should never bypass. Aligning their transactions with the market will allow
the parties to avoid criminal liability for bribery and related offenses. To secure
the required alignment, public officials and the individuals they deal with only
need to be familiar with the market within which they operate and with the
market’s rules.
This familiarity is easy to acquire and it will likely be present in virtually
every case. Public officials and private-sector entrepreneurs know exactly when
they carry out a regular business transaction and when they bypass the market
by forming a mutually beneficial deal. These professionals are also well aware
of the relevant contractual and other legal entitlements—both tangible and
intangible—that they undertake to respect. The market benchmark is also
robust enough to enable courts and prosecutors to distinguish between bribery
(and related offenses) and legitimate business. This benchmark will also prompt
courts to rely on the economic preferences manifested by relevant transactions
and to steer away from “noise” (the parties’ and other witnesses’ reconstructive
narratives).
As a concrete example, consider a law firm that provides a discounted legal
service to a senior public official. The firm gives the official this discount in
order to advance its reputation. Having the official in the firm’s portfolio of
clients communicates to potential clients that the firm does high quality work.
For the firm, the market value of this signal is greater than the discount it gives

21. See generally Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741 (1993).
22. Id. at 769–77.
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the official. For his part, the official obtains the discount by taking advantage of
his reputational value to the firm. This transaction may be ethically
questionable. It might be unethical for a public official to cash his reputational
value in this way. The focus here is on criminal law, however—not on ethics.
Therefore, the ethical issue merits no further discussion. As far as criminal law
is concerned, the exchange between the official and the firm squarely aligns
with the market. Consequently, the “two-sided off-market benefit” criterion
rules out the possibility of convicting one of the parties of bribery, unlawful
23
gratuity, or honest-services fraud.
Things could be different if the parties’ exchange were to include an implicit
understanding that the official will use his authority to promote the interests of
the firm or any of its clients. Under this scenario, part of the discount the
official receives from the firm—if not the entire discount amount—would
constitute an off-market benefit. The firm’s position as the holder of the
official’s express or implicit promise of help would constitute an off-market
benefit as well. The parties’ exchange would consequently qualify as a
corruption offense: bribery, unlawful gratuity, or honest-services fraud—
depending upon the nature of the official’s promise of help and the strength of
the nexus between that promise and the discount.
Arguably, prosecutors would find it difficult to differentiate between the
two types of exchange because parties will always claim their exchange to be
innocent. This projection is overstated. The prosecution would always be able
to juxtapose the parties’ exchange against the rates the relevant market has
24
established for similar transactions. This juxtaposition is more promising than
reliance on the parties’ and other witnesses’ narratives. When the parties’

23. See Kathleen Clark, Paying the Price for Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and
Other Ways that Government Officials Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 65, 112–13 (1997)
(criticizing the Justice Department’s censure of the discounts law firms gave to public officials, and
observing, “[f]irst, these donating lawyers may be motivated by a desire to work on interesting, highprofile cases that may garner them publicity. Second, they may see such work as within their pro bono
mission—an obligation to do work in the public interest regardless of a client’s ability to pay. Third, a
law firm’s decision to provide discounted legal services may be no different from the decision of a
rental car agency or an airline to provide government employees with a discount on their regular
rates”) (internal footnotes omitted).
24. See United States v. Townsend, 630 F.3d 1003, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 2011) (relying on market to
determine whether improved bail conditions obtained by defendant by bribing his supervising officer
had a $5000 or greater value for purposes of the $5000 threshold that established federal jurisdiction);
United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 266–70 (3d Cir. 2007) (attesting that loans below market value
received by public official from a bank constitute bribery and honest-services frauds); United States v.
Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1191–94 (5th Cir. 1996) (relying on market to determine, for purposes of the
$5000 federal-jurisdiction threshold, the value of unauthorized conjugal visits with a prisoner’s wife and
mistress that the prisoner obtained by bribing a sheriff and his deputy); Klaczak v. Consol. Med.
Transp., 458 F. Supp. 2d 622, 639–61 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (determining value of a kickback by reference to
market value for ambulance transports); United States v. McLaren Reg’l Med. Ctr., 202 F. Supp. 2d
671, 674–78 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (determining value of kickbacks by reference to market rental value of
real estate); United States v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1107 (D. Kan 1999) (“Only the difference
between the fair market value and the proposed purchase price would be considered the solicitation of
a bribe.”).
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exchange is off-market and when they have—or anticipate having—a business
relationship besides the official’s representation by the firm, the prosecution
will find it easy to establish the presence of criminal corruption. Absent such
25
evidence, charges of corruption will be unfounded. Similarly, no prosecution
for bribery should be initiated when the parties’ transaction constitutes a
26
voluntary market-based exchange.
With this in mind, I now turn to discuss the Supreme Court’s interpretations
of three corruption offenses: bribery, unlawful gratuity, and honest-services
fraud.
III
SUN-DIAMOND REVISITED
The Supreme Court began its precedential decision in Sun-Diamond by
observing that the divine punishment for corruption is economically inefficient.
“Talmudic sages”—wrote Justice Scalia for the unanimous court—
believed that judges who accepted bribes would be punished by eventually losing all
knowledge of the divine law, [while the] Federal Government, dealing with many
public officials who are not judges, and with at least some judges for whom this
sanction holds no terror, has constructed a framework of human laws . . . defining
various sorts of impermissible gifts, and punishing27those who give or receive them with
administrative sanctions, fines, and incarceration.

This observation created an anticipation that the Court would move on to
fix the deterrence shortfall by giving more power to the human anticorruption
laws. This anticipation was only momentary, however, as the Court quickly
made it clear that it would not expand the scope of bribery and unlawful
gratuity prohibitions. In fact, the Court’s decision took the federal anti-bribery
25. A point of disclosure: this example reflects the opinion I gave as a consultant in a bribery case.
26. Such prosecutions would also be unfounded in relation to corrupt markets where bribery
functions as a social norm. In those markets, government agents are guilty of extortion, but private
people who “bribe” those agents cannot be considered criminally corrupt because they buy themselves
no advantage over other bribers. This point resonates with a story about a judge in a developing
country who made the following announcement to the plaintiff and the defendant: “Because each of
you paid me the same amount, I am going to decide this case according to law.” For an American-law
example that borderlines with the “everyone is doing it” defense, see United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d
730, 735 (4th Cir. 1976). This decision discusses what then appeared to be a norm among bankers: using
the bank’s money to make political contributions in order to bond with the politicians. According to the
court, such “goodwill” expenditures are not bribery when the donor merely aims to create a “favorable
business climate.” Specifically, the Fourth Circuit decided that
the crucial distinction between ‘goodwill’ expenditures and bribery is, then, the existence or
nonexistence of criminal intent that the benefit be received by the official as a quid pro quo
for some official act, pattern of acts, or agreement to act favorably to the donor when
necessary. . . . If ‘influence’ is given its broadest common meaning, it is clear that ‘goodwill’
gifts and favors to and entertainment of government officials are intended to influence the
judgment of such officials. That is, such expenditures are made with the hope that the officials
will be more likely to award government business to the donor if a favorable business climate
is created than if such a climate is not established. But . . . this type of influence does not
amount to bribery.
Id.
27. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 400 (1999).
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statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, in the opposite direction.
Facts upon which this decision was made are remarkable. The defendant,
Sun-Diamond, was an agricultural trade association representing about 5000
farmers. These farmers were interested in the government’s doing and not
doing certain things related to their business. The farmers wanted the
Department of Agriculture (DOA) to give them grants for promoting sales of
farm commodities in foreign countries. They did not want the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to ban their cheap pesticide—methyl bromide. And
they also did not want this agency to fund the search for the pesticide’s
substitutes. Correspondingly, they wanted the DOA to block the EPA’s
initiative.
Because both governmental departments—DOA and EPA—were supposed
to promote public good that did not necessarily align with the farmers’ interests,
Sun-Diamond made a special effort to create the alignment. As part of this
effort, it befriended the Agriculture Secretary, Mr. Michael Espy. The bonding
between the two sides to this new friendship included gifts that Sun-Diamond
gave to Mr. Espy, which he graciously accepted. These gifts included tickets to
the 1993 U.S. Open Tennis Tournament in the amount of $2295; luggage worth
$2427; meals worth $665; and, finally, a framed print and crystal bowl purchased
at $524. The gifts’ total cost was $5900 (in 1993). For his part, Mr. Espy did
nothing to benefit the farmers represented by Sun-Diamond, nor did he give
them any explicit or implied promise to help.
The government argued that this evidence established that Sun-Diamond
gave Mr. Espy an unlawful gratuity and, thus, perpetrated a crime under section
201(c)(1)(A), a statute that prohibits giving “anything of value” to a public
official “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such
28
public official.” Sun-Diamond strenuously disagreed. Though admitting it gave
the aforementioned gifts to Mr. Espy, who was at the time the Agriculture
Secretary, and that the gifts were “of value,” Sun-Diamond claimed it was not
guilty of the alleged crime.
How come? According to Sun-Diamond, the reason was simple: It gave
those gifts to Mr. Espy neither “for” nor “because” of any specific “official act”
that he performed or was supposed to perform.
The District Court accepted the government’s position that
under the gratuity statute, it is not necessary for the indictment to allege a direct nexus
between the value conferred to Secretary Espy by Sun-Diamond and an official act
performed or to be performed by Secretary Espy. It is sufficient for the indictment to
allege that
Sun-Diamond provided things of value to Secretary Espy because of his
29
position.

After trial, the court gave the jury a similar instruction about the applicable
30
law and the jury found Sun-Diamond guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals
28. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2006).
29. 941 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (D.D.C. 1996).
30. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 403.

STEIN_BOOKPROOF_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

72

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

3/12/2012 3:12 PM

[Vol. 75:61

reversed this conviction and remanded the case for a new trial after finding that
the District Court’s instruction “invited the jury to convict on materially less
evidence than the statute demands—evidence of gifts driven simply by Espy’s
31
official position.” The Court of Appeals, however, also rejected SunDiamond’s claim that the government needs to prove that a gratuity was given
32
“for or because of” a particular official act. According to the Court of Appeals,
the government will satisfy its burden by proving the giver’s “intent to reward
33
past favorable acts or to make future ones more likely.” Under this definition
of the requisite mens rea, the government had enough evidence to move its case
to the jury.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court, disagreed with this ruling.
According to him, the “official act” element is “pregnant with the requirement
34
that some particular official act be identified and proved.” Otherwise, held
Justice Scalia, section 201(c)(1)(A)
would criminalize, for example, token gifts to the President based on his official
position and not linked to any identifiable act—such as the replica jerseys given by
championship sports teams each year during ceremonial White House visits [and a]
high school principal’s gift of a school baseball cap to the Secretary35 of Education, by
reason of his office, on the occasion of the latter’s visit to the school.

For Justice Scalia, these patently unacceptable consequences call for
interpreting the unlawful-gratuity prohibition narrowly.
Justice Scalia alluded to these consequences as a supplementary, rather than
a main, reason for interpreting section 201(c)(1)(A) as he did. His main reasons
36
relied on two canons of statutory interpretation. First, criminal prohibitions
should generally be given a narrow meaning that favors freedom over
37
unfreedom. Hence, it is up to Congress to adopt “a broadly prophylactic
criminal prohibition upon gift giving” if it really prefers such a broad
38
prohibition. Second, to avoid overcriminalization and excessive punishment,
criminal prohibitions should be understood as part of the legal system’s
39
regulatory mechanism as a whole. From this perspective, “a narrow, rather
than a sweeping, prohibition is more compatible with the fact that §
201(c)(1)(A) is merely one strand of an intricate web of regulations, both
administrative and criminal, governing the acceptance of gifts and other self40
enriching actions by public officials.” “[C]riminal statutes”—as Justice Scalia
explained—“are merely the tip of the regulatory iceberg” that includes an
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
lenity).
38.
39.
40.

138 F.3d 961, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 969.
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406.
Id. at 406–07.
Id. at 408–09.
See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2422–23 (2006) (describing rule of
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 408.
Id.
Id. at 409.
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administrative prohibition for any “employee of the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch [to] . . . accept anything of value from a person . . . whose
interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance
41
of the individual’s official duties.” Based on these reasons, Justice Scalia
concluded that, “in order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A),
the Government must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a
42
public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it was given.”
This decision suffers from a number of flaws. The first flaw is
miscategorization. For a reason that Justice Scalia did not articulate, his
decision brings the applicable evidentiary and substantive criminal law
requirements under a single roof of section 201(c)(1)(A). This interpretive
move is mystifying. Most criminal prohibitions, to use Justice Scalia’s language,
are not pregnant with evidentiary requirements, and section 201(c)(1)(A) does
not appear to be exceptional. The provisions of this section do not say anything
about evidence. They are strictly about substantive criminal law—specifically,
the definition of the “unlawful gratuity” offense. Under this definition, a person
commits the offense when he gives a public official “anything of value . . . for or
because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public
43
official.” How to prove that the person gave the official a gift “for or because
of any official act performed or to be performed by” that official is a separate
matter—one addressed by the law of evidence. Specifically, evidence law
provides that the prosecution can prove a defendant’s guilt by any admissible
44
evidence that the jury finds credible “beyond a reasonable doubt.” There are
crimes in relation to which the law sets some additional evidentiary
45
requirements for convicting a person, but section 201(c)(1)(A) is not one of
them.
Furthermore, granted that writing a special evidentiary requirement into
section 201(c)(1)(A) would somehow be a good idea, why require the
government to prove unlawful-gratuity accusations by evidence that identifies
46
“a link between [the gift] and a specific ‘official act’”? Why not follow the
general evidence law that affords the government flexibility in proving
defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Specifically, why prefer direct
evidence to circumstantial? As virtually all evidence specialists will confirm,
circumstantial evidence is as good as direct evidence—among other things,
47
because “circumstances cannot lie.”
41. Id. at 410 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7353(a)(2) (2006)).
42. Id. at 414.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). Although Congress did not italicize the
word “any,” doing so might have been a good idea.
44. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 172–83 (2005) (explaining the “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement). This requirement is mandated by the Constitution. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
45. For examples, see STEIN, supra note 44, at 18–25.
46. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414.
47. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE:
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The principle “circumstances cannot lie” also applies to the economics of
transactions. People sometimes lie about the nature of their transactions, but
the economics underlying those transactions always reveal their true nature.
The gift transaction between Sun-Diamond and Secretary Espy is no exception.
This transaction had established a bonding relationship between the two
parties—in simple terms, favoritism. This relationship followed the format of an
48
under-specified relational agreement. Sun-Diamond gave Mr. Espy gifts to
make him favorably disposed toward the affiliated farmers’ interests, and Mr.
Espy accepted these gifts to create this disposition. This disposition included the
Secretary’s implicit, indefinite, and unspecified promise to help the farmers
when it became possible and convenient. That this promise was implicit,
indefinite, and unspecified does not make the promise inconsequential. The
promise had economic value, and this value was far from trivial. Hence, the
Secretary received Sun-Diamond’s gifts “for or because of any official act” that
49
he might perform in the future.
Justice Scalia’s decision defies this economic logic. This defiance is
unjustified. It breaks away from another canonical principle, popularized by
Justice Scalia’s former colleague at the University of Chicago. As Milton
50
Friedman famously observed, “There’s no such thing as a free lunch.” By the
same token, and contrary to Justice Scalia’s decision, there are also no such
things as free tickets to a U.S. Open Tennis Tournament, free luggage, free
51
meals, and a free crystal bowl. Application of the “off-market exchange”
criterion easily verifies this observation (if it still requires verification). Under
this criterion, an exchange between a private citizen and a public official
constitutes bribery or unlawful gratuity whenever it yields both parties benefits
not available on the market. The market, as we know it, does not offer for free
any of the valuables Sun-Diamond gave to Secretary Espy, nor does it freely
distribute favoritism agreements with the government’s agents. Sun-Diamond’s
gifts induced Mr. Espy to help the affiliated farmers at society’s expense. As
such, they constituted an unlawful gratuity under section 201(c)(1)(A). Justice
Scalia’s concern about potential criminalization of token gifts is exaggerated. To
the best of my knowledge, no person has ever been prosecuted for (let alone
convicted of) corruption based on her giving or receiving a jersey, a T-shirt, a
baseball cap, or other memorabilia. Similarly, no person has ever been
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 217 (1991) (attesting that
the maxim “circumstances cannot lie” had become commonplace already in the Eighteenth Century).
48. Compare again the structure of this agreement with the features of relational contracts laid out
in Macneil, supra note 16.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2006).
50. MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH (1977).
51. Cf. United States v. Williams, 7 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss
indictment against lobbyist for Tyson Foods company, who gave Secretary Espy “seats to the 1993
Presidential inaugural gala, travel and lodging connected with a Tyson birthday party . . . travel, lodging
and tickets to a National Football Conference playoff game . . . , a Tyson foundation scholarship for the
Secretary’s girlfriend, and, for the Acting Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, a $13 basketball ticket and
a first-class upgrade coupon for an airplane flight”).
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prosecuted for providing a government’s visitor lunch or dinner. (And,
conversely, no public official has ever been prosecuted for eating lunch or
dinner while visiting a private firm or institution.) American prosecutors,
judges, and juries possess enough common sense and good will to avert such
absurdities.
The off-market exchange criterion sets up an even better safety barrier
against such absurd prosecutions. Virtually all memorabilia gifts are openmarket transactions following a uniform pattern. The public official acquires no
pecuniary benefit from receiving a memorabilia gift. And neither does the gift’s
giver acquire any business advantage for himself—besides the enhancement of
visibility and reputation from the official’s holding or wearing of the gift. This
benefit may have substantial economic value, but it induces no official action on
the part of the official and hence does not constitute a bribe or unlawful
gratuity. More crucially, a memorabilia gift creates no exclusivity in the parties’
relationship because the official can—and, in all likelihood, will—receive
similar gifts from others. The gift, therefore, does not affect the official’s
evenhandedness, nor does it diminish other private actors’ opportunities to
successfully deal with the government.
Things become different when a memorabilia gift goes off market (and thus
stops being a pure memorabilia gift). For example, if the chief of police were to
receive from a baseball stadium owner Mark McGwire’s seventieth home run
52
ball, he would likely be taking a bribe or unlawful gratuity. The reason is
simple: Such memorabilia items are expensive, exclusive, and consequently are
never given for free on the open market. By the same token, an IRS official will
do well to decline a lunch invitation from an accounting firm after seeing
53
Petrossian Kaluga caviar on the menu.
IV
THE ECONOMIC ILLOGIC OF SKILLING
A. McNally’s Legacy
Sun-Diamond’s nexus requirement excessively narrowed the scope of the
“unlawful gratuity” prohibition. This narrow interpretation of section
54
201(c)(1)(A) is socially undesirable, but the Sun-Diamond Justices had a
different opinion. Based on that opinion, the Justices interpreted the definition
55
of bribery—an offense more serious than unlawful gratuity —by interposing a
52. See Jay Nolan, Is a Home Run Baseball Worth Millions of Dollars?, NAT’L EXAMINER, May
11, 2010, available at http://www.examiner.com/sports-memorabilia-in-national/is-a-home-run-baseballworth-millions-of-dollars? (reporting auction purchase of Mark McGwire’s seventieth and final homerun ball for $3,000,000).
53. See PETROSSIAN, http://www.petrossian.com/caviar-1-kaluga-caviar-605.html (last visited Nov.
17, 2011) (pricing 50g Kaluga caviar at $481).
54. See discussion, supra Part II.
55. For the definition of bribery as to the giver, see section 201(b)(1), and as to the recipient, see
section 201(b)(2). Bribery is punishable by imprisonment for up to fifteen years, as well as by fine and
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similar nexus requirement. Justice Scalia, writing on behalf of the unanimous
Court, underscored that the key element of the bribery offense is quid pro quo:
a “specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an
56
official act.” More precisely, as he went on to explain, “Bribery requires intent
57
‘to influence’ an official act or ‘to be influenced’ in an official act.” Under
general evidence law, the prosecution must establish the presence of this
58
specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Failure to do so will lead to the
59
defendant’s acquittal.
The narrow scope of the two core corruption offenses has left a wide variety
of corrupt activities underdeterred. Under Sun-Diamond, when a public official
receives a gift, the gift will only be criminal if it was given or received as a
reward for the official’s specific action. Favoritism fueled by gifts falls outside
the scope of criminal corruption, although it will normally violate one of the
criminal or administrative rules prohibiting public officials from positioning
60
themselves in a conflict of interests. Conflicts of interests, however, are not
punishable as severely as bribery and unlawful gratuity and are also not as
61
stigmatizing as these two offenses. Furthermore, in most instances, the only
party responsible for such misconduct is the official who receives the gift, but
not the gift’s private giver.
62
McNally v. United States gave the Supreme Court an early opportunity to
eliminate the deterrence shortfall resulting from the narrow understanding of
bribery and unlawful gratuity. In McNally, the Court took upon itself to
delineate the scope of the federal mail-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341,
proscribing the use of mail to carry out “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
63
representations, or promises.” This broad prohibition could be interpreted as
proscribing all forms of corruption in the public service falling outside the scope
of core bribery offenses. Indeed, the attorneys who argued the case on behalf of
64
the United States asked the Court to interpret section 1341 in this way.
The set of facts upon which the Court decided the case was particularly
suitable for that purpose. A senior public official in Kentucky was paid
commissions (through companies he owned) for securing the payer’s business as
a provider of insurance services under the state’s workman-compensation
various disqualifications. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). For the definition of unlawful gratuity as to the
giver, see section 201(c)(1)(A), and as to the recipient, see section 201(c)(1)(B). Unlawful gratuity is
punishable by imprisonment for up to two years and a fine. Id. § 201(c).
56. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999).
57. Id. at 404.
58. See STEIN, supra note 44, at 172–83.
59. Id.
60. For a more or less comprehensive list of these rules, see Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 409–11.
61. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2006) and 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202 (2011) (categorizing gifts received by
public officials under certain circumstances as ethical, rather than criminal, violations).
62. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
64. McNally, 483 U.S. at 352.
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program. Based on these facts, the official and his two accomplices were
accused of devising a scheme to deprive Kentucky’s citizens and government of
65
their “intangible rights” to have the state’s affairs conducted honestly. This
scheme yielded the parties a handsome profit. Yet, as the Court noted, the State
did not suffer much as a result of this fraudulent scheme. It was deprived only
of its intangible right to receive honest services from its official. And, as the
Court clarified, no accusation was made that “in the absence of the alleged
scheme the [State] would have paid a lower premium or secured better
66
insurance.”
The Court’s assumption of the scheme’s “Pareto-superiority” was patently
false. The insurer found it profitable to earn the premiums that appeared in its
policies while paying the State’s official $X to secure this transaction. Hence, in
a face-to-face bargain with the State, the insurer would certainly have agreed to
reduce the premiums by up to $X. The State was, therefore, fraudulently
deprived not only of its official’s honest services, but also of the money—or
some of the money—the official pocketed as a “commission.” From an
economic standpoint, this “commission” amounted to a theft. It did not come at
the insurer’s expense, but rather at the expense of the State. Importantly, this
economic assessment is not confined to the facts of McNally. Rather, it will hold
true in every case featuring an official’s self-enrichment. Such self-enrichment
schemes always come at the expense of the government the official is obligated
to serve.
The assumption that the State suffered no pecuniary damage from the
official’s self-enrichment scheme made it easy for the Court to decide that the
67
scheme is “not within the reach of § 1341.” Far from trivializing the State’s
68
intangible damage, the Court held that the criminal prohibition of mail fraud
69
does not guard against this type of harm. According to the Court, if Congress
really desired to protect the government from this type of harm, it should say so
70
explicitly.
B. Skilling
After thinking for about a year, Congress decided to speak explicitly: It
enacted section 1346—a provision criminalizing any “scheme or artifice to
71
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” This broad
formulation makes section 1346 a supplement to the core bribery and unlawful
gratuity offenses—a residual rule that penalizes corruptions not captured by
65. Id.
66. Id. at 360.
67. Id. at 361.
68. Cf. Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815,
1836–46 (2011) (rationalizing criminal prohibitions of corruption as fending off harm to the integrity of
political process and the body politic).
69. McNally, 483 U.S. at 359–61.
70. Id. at 359–60.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
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those offenses’ definitions. This residual applicability is what Congress
attempted to accomplish.
72
Alas, this legislative attempt has failed. In Skilling v. United States, the
Supreme Court decided that section 1346 needed to undergo comprehensive
73
redrafting, guided by the lenity rule. Under this rule, when a criminal statute
has two or more plausible meanings, courts should interpret it by adopting the
74
meaning that favors the defendant’s case.
The lenity rule was not the only ground for the Court’s decision. The Court
75
also relied on the “void for vagueness” doctrine. This constitutional doctrine
invalidates criminal statutes that are open to multiple interpretations and
consequently force people to guess what the law means to prohibit (while
76
allowing the government to prosecute individuals almost at will). Based on this
doctrine, the Court made an assessment that the unedited definition of honest77
services fraud is unconstitutionally vague. This assessment prompted the Court
to find out whether the new offense can be disambiguated instead of being
78
voided. Based on this innovative principle of “statutory survival,” the Court
used the lenity rule to narrow the scope of section 1346. Specifically, the Court
interpreted the honest-services fraud offense as prohibiting bribery and
79
kickback payments, and nothing else. This interpretation rested on the Court’s
assumption that Congress’s only goal in legislating section 1346 was to overturn
McNally—a case in which the defendants managed to escape conviction
notwithstanding the presence of a kickback payment.
This narrow interpretation of section 1346 prompted the Court to invalidate
the convictions of three petitioners (in separate cases). The first petitioner was
Enron’s former CEO, Jeffrey Skilling, who participated in an elaborate scheme
to prop up Enron’s stock price while hiding its financial losses. The Court held
that Skilling’s participation in that scheme did not constitute honest-services
fraud in and of itself. Skilling could only be convicted of that offense upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that he received a bribe or a kickback payment for
80
his part in the scheme. The Court remanded Skilling’s case for determination
81
whether the honest-services fraud instruction of the jury was a harmless error.
The defendants in two other cases, Conrad Black and Bruce Weyhrauch, have

72. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
73. Id. at 2932–33.
74. Id. at 2933–34.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2933–34.
78. Justice Scalia properly criticizes this innovation by attesting that “in transforming the
prohibition of ‘honest-services fraud’ into a prohibition of ‘bribery and kick-backs’ [the Court] is
wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define new federal crimes.” Id. at 2935 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
79. Id. at 2933–35.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2935.
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been equally successful. The Court vacated their honest-services fraud
82
convictions as well.
The Skilling decision has created a setback for prosecutions of corruptions
occurring in the public service. Such prosecutions can now only be successful
against defendants who committed bribery or unlawful-gratuity offenses, as
83
defined in Sun-Diamond.
The aftermath of the Skilling decision was equally disappointing. Consider
84
United States v. Riley, a case in which the Third Circuit invalidated the
conviction of Newark’s former Mayor and his girlfriend. Evidence upon which
the jury found the two defendants guilty of violating section 1346 demonstrated
that the Mayor used his control over the city’s redevelopment plan to secure the
girlfriend’s discounted acquisition of city-owned properties. The girlfriend had
no experience in property development; and so, instead of developing the
85
properties, she sold them at a profit. The Third Circuit decided that this
evidence did not warrant conviction under section 1346 because it did not
86
establish that the Mayor received a kickback or a bribe.
87
This example is by no means unique. In United States v. Coniglio, the Third
Circuit addressed the implications of the Skilling decision on the conviction of a
former New Jersey state senator who had entered into a “consulting
agreement” with a medical center. The agreement masked the center’s
undertaking to remunerate him for improper official actions that benefited the
center financially. After a three-week trial, the court instructed the jury to find
the defendant guilty of honest-services fraud if it determined that he took a
bribe or, alternatively, that he acted as a senator under a concealed conflict of
88
interests. The Third Circuit decided that the “conflict of interests” instruction
did not align with Skilling because it omitted the “bribe or kickback” element.
This omission led jurors to form the wrong belief that the defendant’s conflict of
interests, without more, suffices for his conviction. The Third Circuit
89
consequently had no choice but to overturn the conviction.

82. Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010); Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971
(2010) (per curiam); see also HARVARD L. REV. ASS’N, The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 124
HARV. L. REV. 179, 360–70 (2010) (discussing Skilling, Black, and Weyhrauch and explaining the
outcome of these decisions as the Court’s reaction to the prosecution’s overuse of its power).
According to the survey’s authors, the prosecution in these cases charged conduct that only “debatably
violate[d] the prohibiting statute.” Id. at 360.
83. The honest-services fraud offense did not become completely redundant. See Skilling, 130 S.
Ct. at 2934, n.45 (“Overlap with other federal statutes does not render § 1346 superfluous. The
principal federal bribery statute, § 201, for example, generally applies only to federal public officials, so
§ 1346’s application to state and local corruption and to private-sector fraud reaches misconduct that
might otherwise go unpunished.”).
84. 621 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2010).
85. Id. at 319, 328.
86. Id. at 339.
87. 417 Fed. App’x 146 (3d Cir. 2011).
88. Id. at 148.
89. Id. at 149–51.
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The Skilling decision is flawed in a number of respects. First, section 1346 is
not vague. This provision protects the right to honest services by criminalizing
those who act fraudulently to deprive individuals of this right. Hence, in order
to convict a person under this provision, the prosecution must establish the
presence of a right to receive honest services and that right’s scope. After
establishing these elements, the prosecution must prove that the defendant
fraudulently violated or procured the violation of the right. In the private
sector, this right is determined by contract. Within the framework of public
service, this right is determined by a combination of contract, regulatory
provisions, and general public law. If there is a serious doubt as to the right’s
scope, or whether it existed in the first place, the court will have to acquit the
defendant. The right to receive honest services does not differ in this regard
from proprietary entitlements that criminal law protects against theft and other
forms of embezzlement.
The honest-services fraud offense is, indeed, very general. But being general
is different from being vague. There is no constitutional bar against broad
criminal prohibitions, as opposed to prohibitions that have multiple meanings.
Nor should there be such a bar: Oftentimes, broad criminal prohibitions are the
best way to fend off crime. Consider, for example, conspiracy “to defraud the
90
United States . . . in any manner or for any purpose.” This offense is very
broad and sufficiently clear at the same time. There can be no doubt about this
offense’s constitutionality. As such, the broad definition of honest-services
fraud, as designed by Congress, also aligns with the Constitution.
On the operational level, the “off market benefit” criterion makes the
prohibition of honest-services fraud easy to implement. In Skilling, the key
question under this criterion would be whether the conspiracy to prop up
Enron’s stock prices yielded an off-market benefit to any of the parties. The
answer to this question is an unequivocal yes: The whole purpose of the Enron
conspiracy was to allow the conspirators to generate profits that the market
91
would have denied.
In McNally, the presence of an off-market benefit was equally apparent.
The insurer obtained a profitable contract with the state by bypassing market
competition. This contract constituted an off-market benefit. The official who
secured this contract and helped the insurer bypass the market received a
commission. This commission amounted to an off-market benefit as well
because the official would not have received it on the open market.
By the same logic, both the Riley and Coniglio cases featured an off-market
benefit. The transactions that took place in these cases are not available on the
open market. Consequently, parties to those transactions were guilty of honestservices fraud. Moreover, these actors were guilty of bribery as well because the
90. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
91. Ultimately, Skilling’s convictions were upheld by the Fifth Circuit on remand, after the court
decided that the honest-services fraud instruction the jurors had received was a “harmless error.”
United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 488 (5th Cir. 2011).
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off-market benefits they accrued through those transactions were two-sided.
V
CONCLUSION
My proposed criterion for identifying bribery and unlawful gratuity—
accrual of an off-market benefit by both sides to the suspected deal—is
preferable to the Supreme Court’s “specific act” requirement. This criterion
captures all variants of bribery without leaving off anything. Under this
criterion, courts will abandon noisy signals, coming from the parties’ and other
witnesses’ narratives, and will base their decisions on the economics of the
suspected deal. When these economics reveal the presence of a two-sided offmarket benefit, this benefit cannot be accidental. Under such circumstances, the
parties clearly intend to give and receive a bribe or unlawful gratuity. On the
other hand, absence of a two-sided off-market benefit will show that the parties’
transaction involved no bribery or unlawful gratuity. For purposes of the
honest-services fraud offense, the off-market benefit criterion will be very
helpful as well. Under the definition of the offense, however, the off-market
benefit can be accrued by any party to the fraudulent scheme. The prosecution,
in other words, will only need to show that one of the parties fraudulently
generated an off-market benefit for himself at the victim’s expense. In a typical
case, of course, this party will share the benefit with other participants in the
fraudulent scheme.

